110 STCL, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter, 1990) We may recall that "The Rhetoric of Temporality" was originally published in 1969 and that it is divided into two parts, "Allegory and Symbol" and "Irony." Both parts correspond very closely and can be seen as analogous to a two part musical invention. In the first part, de Man demonstrates by comparative literary analysis that during the 18th century the shift in rhetorical emphasis from allegorization to symbolization did not occur without resistance. He demonstrates the point in the context of German, English, and, finally, French literature. De Man argues that in Rousseau's Julie ou la nouvelle Heloise the analogy between scene and emotion is tightly joined thanks to the appearance of the symbol which brings signifying elements into a simultaneous relation. In Rousseau, therefore, the text's naturalism and the contingency of temporal moments are rendered symbolically, though in the very garden scenes where such naturalism is constituted, de Man discovers an allegorical register which resists naturalism and, instead, embraces very artificial conjunctions. These break with the sort of human perception that would function as the enabling condition for symbolization and naturalism: "The (allegorical' language is purely figural, not based on perception, less still on an experienced dialectic between nature and consciousness" (Blindness and Insight, 203) . Whereas the symbol holds a language of natural correspondences together, allegory disrupts sensualistic correspondences even as it sets up a secondary order of references which are not organically related. For de Man the symbol brings entities into a spatial and simultaneous relation, while allegory brings entities into a temporal and disjunctive relation. Moreover, the symbol is assumed to be constative (passively reflecting what is always already given) while allegory is assumed to be performative (actively producing new meanings in a more or less ad hoc manner). But this is not all. Symbols ensure narrative continuity, while allegories ensure disjunctive iteration. Symbols therefore are aligned with identity while allegories are aligned with difference. At the close of "Symbol and Allegory" de Man will emphasize that symbol and allegory are not, in fact, two different rhetorical orders but that they are both aspects of the same rhetoric in whose conflict a rearticulation of literature is brought about. Yet, there is irony in this conflict. The impression of realist authenticity which the symbol conveys is, in fact, known to be a superficial illusion which betrays the enlightenment of an earlier age that privileged allegory. Although allegory is superseded by the symbol in the nineteenth century, 2 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1990] , Art. 10 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol14/iss1/10 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1246 I I I writers ironically are unable to use symbols with "an entirely good poetic conscience" (BI 208 ).
In part two, de Man alerts us to two manifestations of irony, the one synthetic, the other disjunctive. This division of irony therefore imitates the difference between symbol and allegory, suggesting the musical structure of invention. The synthetic manifestation of irony allows for consciousness to reconcile a number of conflicts and for language to prevail over a subject's self-alienation. The disjunctive manifestation of irony introduces an endless sequence of disjunct moments which are never reconciled but infinitely repeated as the repetition of what de Man calls a self-escalating act of consciousness. Such irony "reveals the existence of a temporality that is definitely not organic, in that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and difference and allows for no end, for no totality" (BI 222 ). Yet, although the performance of disjunctive irony and of allegory reveal a similar temporal structure, that of iteration and difference, they are dissimilar in that allegory extends or spreads out temporality while irony compresses or condenses it. Still, irony and allegory are considered "two faces of the same fundamental experience of time" (BI 226 Miller, 156) According to Miller, de Man is insisting that we do not deconstruct texts, but that figurally texts deconstruct themselves because of the way in which-to take one example-metaphors are sedimented or superimposed on one another. We are considering something like a Freudian condensation in which disjunctions, contradictions, and outright incompatibilities bring "aberrancy into the open" (158). As de Man puts it, "A narrative endlessly tells the story of its own denominational aberration and it can only repeat this aberration on various levels of rhetorical complexity" (158). Miller points out that for de Man the text's auto-deconstruction generates auxiliary readings, each of which is aberrant. Miller's inference is that this autodeconstruction can already be seen in essays like "The Rhetoric of Temporality" in so far as symbol, allegory, and irony tell the story of their own denominational aberrations which they are compelled to repeat. The way in which these tropological levels overlap would, for the later de Man, make up allegorical registers. Hence one could speak of second and third order narratives which "tell the story of the failure to read" (161), the failure to generate homogeneous meaning systems. The complexity of such contrapuntal superimpositions is well reflected in Miller's astute observation:
The term 'degree' here is slightly odd, as is the addition in parentheses of 'or the third.' By 'or the third' I suppose de Man means that the deconstruction of the initially asserted figure or system of figures could already be thought of as a second narrative superimposed on the first, so that the allegory of the failure to read can be thought of as already a third narrative posited over the first two, while if the positing of the figure and its deconstruction are thought of as a single story, then the allegory is only the second narrative. (161) But why does de Man use the word "allegory"? This is a question Miller wants to address, and not surprisingly it will lead him to reconsider "The Rhetoric of Temporality." Miller points out that for de Man allegory is always narrative and, as such, always temporalized. Allegories are in a sign-sign relation, Miller says, while symbols are in a sign-thing relation, and, as we noted above, allegory is characteristic of distance and difference, while symbols are characterized by nearness and identification. In bringing these positions in relation to the comments above from de Man's Allegories ofReading, Temporality," since in Allegories the privileged scene turns on an embrace strangely reminiscent of the Psyche and Eros myth. In Allegories, however, the embrace is cited in Rousseau. Once again, aporias of disjunction and conjunction come to the surface. So too do the rhetorical features of irony, allegory, and symbol (though Jacobs doesn't note them). Not surprisingly, this is followed by a commentary on "The Rhetoric of Temporality" in which we focus on de Man's construction and deconstruction of the historical schemes which legitimize his arguments. De Man's voice becomes so ironic, Jacobs says, that "it demonstrates the impossibility of being historical" (117). This means that the rhetorical self "rejects its own temporal movement of correcting error to produce (illusory) wisdom and recognizes it or rather performs it as a problem that exists within the rhetoric of temporality. In speaking of other critics and other theories of language, de Man necessarily spreads out along the axis of imaginary time what is, in fact, simultaneous within his text" (117). Jacobs call this the ironization of allegory, a term which complements the allegorization of irony at the end of "The Rhetoric of Temporality." Literary history, Jacobs argues, is the temporality of a rhetoric that vertiginously vacillates between irony and allegory. Maybe she could have said that literary history is the symbol of this vacillation. "Irony and allegory endlessly replace one another: this trajectory can be read as a text engendering other, critical texts or as a text reading itself, as a gain in critical knowledge or as an irresolvable split and endless vacillation" (118). And time turns out to be an illusion created out of a "series of repetitive reversals" (118). This would be hardly a satisfactory conclusion for anyone acquainted with theories of temporality, for it rests on Jacobs' production of an ahistorical mise en abyme which has swallowed time up. Whereas de Man himself has been careful to counterpoint structures in ways that both encourage reflexive crossings as well as dampen assumed correspondences, Jacobs' analysis eventually collapses into a whirlpool of dizzying relationships which finally reduces temporality to mise en abyme or mere vacillation.
Kevin Newmark, in "Paul de Man's History," considers the rhetoric of temporality more squarely in historical materialist terms:
In the kind of move that has become habitual with de Man, historical terms, then, turn out not to be really historical after all, but rather are metaphors, and crude ones at that, for figural relationships. But if historical terms refuse to tell us about history and end up being disguised as metaphors, then perhaps reading metaphors will turn out to be our only reliable means of learning something about history. (123) In considering how de Man reads the tropes of Baudelaire's "Correspondances," Newmark explores how metaphors and similes delimit moments of conjunction and disjunction. Newmark seizes on de Man's handling of the concept of figural transportation in Baudelaire and recalls that two distinct realms are being suggested, the aesthetic and the urban. "A reading that could disclose the urban subway system lurking beneath the lyrical transports of symbolist poetry would clearly be a first and important step in such a direction"
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1990] , Art. 10 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol14/iss1/10 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1246 (127), that direction being the understanding of how literature and history interrelate. These two realms are brought into proximity through the surprise that a literalization of figure or of "transports" enables. What fascinates Newmark is how symbolic relations set up the possibility of a literalization or concretization in which the historical is situated more like an effect of signification rather than its cause: "History is a linguistic event, the arrangement of verbal buildings, a syntax of inscriptions that exists to be memorized and then read" (133). One senses, again, that we are perhaps not so far from the arguments of "The Rhetoric of Temporality." The figural or verbal interplay ("correspondance") in Baudelaire would correspond fairly well to allegory while the liberalization of the figure would relate to de Man's notion of the symbol which brings elements into a simultaneous and concrete relation. For Newmark, the way in which symbol and allegory are held in proximity by a trope which elicits both literal and figural readings delimits the coming to appearance of history in poetic language. Yet, "these figures are merely the incomplete narratives, or allegories, of a purely nonfigurative occurrence that remains beyond them and their pseudomovement, and when they are read, such figures always and again tell the story of their impossibility to occur historically" (134). In spite of this Newmark is willing to talk about actual history: the repeated manifestation of linguistic aporias. Newmark is not so far from recognizing that at best one can bring signifying relations into correspondence which, as in "The Rhetoric of Temporality," outline the trajectory of concrete historical moments while, at the same time, demonstrating why history is mimetically inaccessible. Because Newmark is pushing de Man's tutor text, "Anthropomorphism and Trope in Lyric," further than it actually wants to go, he ends up making the dubious claim that terms like history, economics, and ideology are being rehabilitated by de Man. Newmark's conclusion suggests that such notions are always already under erasure and that they become significant only in relation to "incomplete narratives," "allegories," or a "nonfigurative occurrence." Exactly what that means is not made clear, though Newmark's footnotes suggest that we may find clues in the writings of Walter Benjamin. That Newmark has not provided a detailed account of how de Man read Benjamin and how that reading affects de Man's understanding of history is disappointing. Certainly, Newmark's piece touches on a very suggestive conjunction with Benjamin which most commentators on de Man often miss. Rodolphe Gasche's "In-Difference to Philosophy" once more draws on the "symbol" / "allegory" distinction from "The Rhetoric of Temporality" by counterpointing "rhetoric" to "philosophy." Philosophy is the "discourse of difference" and rhetoric is the discourse of "self-affirmation." But just as philosophy reaches the pinnacle of a discourse of difference in the work of Hegel, one finds a "retrogression toward rhetoric" in figures like Friedrich Schlegel. De Man is to some extent participating in this romantic retrogression:
Despite some major differences to be emphasized hereafter, Paul de Man's linguistic or rhetorical reading of literature and philosophy continues, in a certain manner, that romantic project of dissolving the difference constitutive of both philosophy and literature, philosophy and rhetoric. In the following analysis devoted to de Man's reading of the philosophical texts of Nietzsche, Kant, and Hegel, we will attempt to make this point. (262) More specifically, Gasche's insight will be that, "A rhetorical reading, for de Man, is, indeed, a reading that seeks the transgression of philosophical difference in an indifference that is so radical as to become entirely indifferent-devoid of all relation-to the philosophical." (262) Although Gasche's intriguing essay is far too complex to summarize, the following sentences from the close of his piece will give the reader a good idea of how Gasche situates his thesis:
In short, the literary and the philosophical discourse are, for de Man, meaningful enterprises involved in forgetting or recuperating the nonphenomenal properties of the material and formal act of figuration, properties that come into view, as he insists, through figuration itself, precisely to the extent in which figuration is itself a repetition of the originary violence of positing. All there can be, consequently, is an endless series of acts of imposition that, because they lack all continuity with what precedes them, repeat, without ever lending themselves to any real discrimination, the 'original' arbitrary act of linguistic positing. Ultimately, there is no difference between that act and the authority of meaning. (289) Gasche is developing a point which has also been brought up Lastly, we should take into consideration Jacques Derrida's "Psyche: Inventions of the Other," an essay which implicitly asks to be allegorically superimposed on previous works by Derrida-for example, "The Double Session," "Signeponge," "Limited Inc abc . . . ," "Of An Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in major importance to Derrida's essay is a reconsideration of the performative/constative distinction which de Man invoked in Allegories ofReading. In the chapter, "Rhetoric of Persuasion (Nietzsche)," de Man focused on language as an event or speech act and demonstrates how the constative and the performative are brought into a chiastic relation which breaks with the principle of contradiction: "The first passage 1 in Nietzsche] on identity showed that constative language is in fact performative, but the second passage tin Nietzsche] asserts that the possibility for language to perform is just as fictional as the possibility for language to assert" (Allegories of Reading, p. 129) . De Man concludes, "the differentiation between performative and constative language (which Nietzsche anticipates) is undecidable; the deconstruction leading from the one model to the other is irreversible but it always remains suspended, regardless of how often it is repeated" (A R,p. 130). One of de Man's final points, then, is that "Rhetoric is a text in that it allows for two incompatible, mutually self-destructive points of view, and therefore puts an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any reading or understanding" (AR, p. 131) .
It is noteworthy that in "Psyche: Inventions of the Other" Derrida does not subscribe to the idea that deconstruction delimits the
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1990] deconstructing a conceptual and institutional structure of invention that would neutralize by putting the stamp of reason on some aspect of invention, of inventive power as if it were necessary, over and beyond a certain traditional status of invention, to reinvent the future. (42) Here one can see the extent to which Derrida strongly breaks with Paul de Man in Allegories of Reading. In place of a characterization of deconstruction that stresses impasse, fatality, aporia, grid-lock, impossibility, obstruction, aberrance, and uninterpretability, Derrida views deconstruction as an act of invention, precipitation, broaching, and unblocking. For Derrida deconstruction does not stall in the double binds of the performative and the constative, but "involves an affirmation," invokes a "coming," an "event," or "advent" that is only neutralized by "the stamp of reason." Derrida's notion of invention is not that of de Man's mutually self-destructive points of view which are allegorically fated to achieve a certain grid-lock or the freezing up of the textual machinery; rather, Derrida wants to pursue invention as a founding event or beginning which is always already differed or deferred from what we might call the origin. Invention, for Derrida, is a structure of conceptual relationships which have been traditionally overstabilized by privileging the notion of device (invention as machine or method) and the priority of agency (the inventor). The term "invention" binds a "technical order" to "metaphysical humanism" (44). Inventions require patents, Derrida recalls, and for an invention to be legitimized it must be stabilized or defined within a certain institutional standing.
Although Derrida does not explicitly say so, the invention under discussion throughout this essay is "deconstruction" Ponge in which the figure of Psyche is allegorically suggested as contemplating herself in a double sided mirror or "psyche." "But in French a psyche, a homonym and common noun, is also a large double mirror installed on a rotating stand. The woman, let us say Psyche, her beauty or her truth, can be reflected there, can admire or adorn herself from head to foot" (38-39). Derrida maintains that "Fable" "puts into action the question of reference, of the specularity of language or of literature, and of the possibility of stating the other or speaking to the other" (31). "Fable" takes place as an event
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1990] The infinitely rapid oscillation between the performative and the constative, between language and metalanguage, fiction and nonfiction, autoreference and heteroreference, etc.. does not just produce an essential instability. This instability constitutes that very event-let us say, the work-whose invention disturbs normally, as it were, the norms, the statutes, and the rules. . . .
The fabulatory economy of a very simple little sentence, perfectly normal in its grammar, spontaneously deconstructs the oppositional logic that relies on an untouchable distinction between the performative and the constative and so many other related distinctions; it deconstructs that logic without disabling it totally, to be sure, since it also needs it in order to detonate the speech event. (34) (35) We recall that in "The Rhetoric of Temporality" allegory is performative, differentiating, and diachronic, while the symbol was constative, identifying, and synchronic. "Fable" could be said to make these tropological conditions of language bear on the "invention" of language as an event that does not impede reading or obstruct interpretation, but that deconstructs without disabling, that deconstructs in order to detonate the speech event. The mirror and the woman are but the tropological effects of such a detonation though, at the same time, they are the "double seance" which serves as the triggering mechanism of "Fable." as the invention of the poem. Whereas in de Man temporality manifests itself in the repetition and aberrance of difference, in Derrida's account temporality is situated in terms of that which is coming, of the "event" which is being triggered in the redoubling of the psyche. Hence, just as the symbol is fractured or broken-"Fable" itself refers to the shattering of the mirror-the temporality of allegory is similarly wiped out by an anticipatory or apocalyptic moment of speech as event. Initiating, rupturing, triggering, breaking open, the invention of a "Fable" broaches a dissemination or efflorescence which can no longer be identified with the impotent reading theory championed by de Man. In this division the psyche of deconstruction is itself ruptured or fissured, its double mirror triggering the device of a theory which cannot be reduced to a patent, trademark, or corporate body. This, then, would be the "mind of deconstruction."
Reading de Man Reading is certainly a very important collection of articles on the work of de Man, and it is unfortunate that space does not permit commentary on the other very interesting essays. Although not user friendly, the book will be very important for specialists in contemporary theory with an interest in de Man. Most interesting to me are the ways in which each writer countersigns for de Man's theories and, in particular, the extent to which there is a wider range of evaluations and interpretations than I would have otherwise assumed. Indeed, the collection implicitly demonstrates that even expert readers, all of them very sympathetic or at least receptive to de Man, are still at an exploratory stage of interpretation; no rigid "party line" has been established within this "school." Certainly, the wide discrepancy between Hillis Miller's excellent close reading of de Man and Derrida's powerful and multi-faceted meditation on "invention" strikes me as symptomatic of the wide latitude of possibilities for interpreting de Man's later work. In addition, the entire volume reminds us that de Man's contributions to language and literary study have been of such a high order of critical reflection that, in fact, the recent revelations about de Man's wartime writings seem, for the moment, quite overshadowed. At times one may even be seduced into agreeing with Geoffrey Hartman that "de Man's critique of every tendency to totalize literature or language, to see unity where there is no unity, could be a belated, but still powerful, act of conscience" (23).
